Reputation, Accounting Information and Debt Contracts in Chinese Family Firms  by Li, Hao
95
CHINA JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Vol 3 Issue 1    ©    LexisNexis, 2010
Hao Li**
School of Accountancy, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China
Reputation, Accounting Information and 
Debt Contracts in 
Chinese Family Firms*
Abstract
This paper provides evidence to show that in the presence of imperfect formal 
institutions there is both a substitutional and a complementary relationship between 
accounting information and reputation, an informal institution. Empirical results 
using a sample of family ﬁrms listed in the Chinese A-share stock market from 2004 
to 2007 show that in China, where the legal environment is far from perfect, the 
complementary relationship between reputation and accounting information is more 
pronounced than is the substitutional relationship. Thus, the aggregate eﬀect is that a 
better reputation improves the usefulness of accounting information in debt contracts. 
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1. Introduction
Coase (1937) shows that the costs of entering into and executing contracts and 
managing organizations, and these costs that are neglected by traditional microeconomic 
theory, can be employed to interpret the reasons for a ﬁrm’s existence. He then extends 
these costs to form the concept of “transaction costs.” In a world of positive transaction 
costs, the contracting parties will try to minimize (given constraints) contracting costs. 
Positive accounting theory (PAT), as formulated by Watts and Zimmerman and other 
researchers, views accounting as part of a set of eﬃcient contracts that are agreed by 
the firm and its stakeholders (see Watts and Zimmerman (1986) for a summary of 
related PAT literature from the 1970s). The three major hypotheses proposed by PAT, 
namely, the bonus plan, debt contract and political cost hypotheses, are all based on 
the assumption that accounting information can reduce contracting costs. A natural 
question that arises is: What is the relationship between accounting information and the 
other institutional arrangements that can also reduce these costs?
The prior literature, much of which constitutes cross-country studies, has 
examined the relationship between accounting information and the other formal 
institutional arrangements that can also reduce contracting costs, such as legal origin, 
legal enforcement and public policies. Transaction cost economics, as established by 
Williamson (1979), however, argues that in reality the most common way to solve 
contract disputes is not through a formal institution, but rather through the informal 
institutions that are formed by repeated games among the transaction parties and are 
known as “private order” institutions. Informal institutions can also remedy some of 
the defects of formal institutions (Lin, 1994), and it is thus meaningful to examine 
them. Because of data collection difficulties (Sun et al., 2005) and the problems of 
omitted variables and measurement bias (Gul, 2006), it is difficult for cross-country 
studies to examine the effects of informal institutions and the relationship between 
these institutions and accounting information. At the same time, informal institutions 
guarantee the self-enforcement of contracts and thus do not rely on any third party 
outside the contracting relationship such as the courts. In the face of imperfect formal 
institutions, transactions are more reliant on informal institutions. Hence, I expect 
it to be easier to observe the way in which informal institutions aid the enforcement 
of contracts. China, an emerging market, provides a unique setting for such an 
investigation.
Sun et al. (2006) show that the usefulness of accounting information in debt 
contracts is less pronounced in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than in non-SOEs. After 
ruling out alternative explanations, they conclude that the government’s reputation serves 
as guarantee that SOEs will repay their bank loans, thereby weakening the usefulness of 
accounting information. Reputation is a self-enforcing informal institution (Klein et al., 
1978; Williamson, 1979). It serves to render the present value of future gains when the 
contract is honored greater than that of current gains when it is breached. Reputation 
thus gives the contracting parties the incentive to honor the contract.
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In line with Sun et al. (2006), “debt contract” in this paper refers to a ﬁrm’s ability 
to borrow from banks, and is measured in the empirical analysis by newly acquired 
bank loans in a given year.1 This study extends Sun et al. (2006) in two aspects. First, 
by employing the transaction cost economics framework, it shows that reputation and 
accounting information have both a substitutional and complementary relationship 
in debt contracts. On the one hand, both reputation and accounting information can 
monitor borrowers and reduce their opportunistic behavior, which means that reputation 
can substitute for accounting information in preventing such behavior. On the other 
hand, accounting information provides useful information about the borrowers’ ability 
to repay the debt. Reputation enhances the credibility of such information, thereby 
improving the usefulness of accounting information in debt contracts and suggesting a 
complementary relationship between reputation and accounting information. Second, 
Sun et al. (2006) present only indirect evidence of the eﬀect of reputation, whereas this 
study attempts to measure the reputation of family ﬁrms and provides direct evidence of 
its eﬀect.
The empirical results of the study reported herein, which adopted a sample of all 
family firms listed in the Chinese A-share stock market from 2004 to 2007, show 
that in China, where formal institutions are far from perfect, the complementary 
relationship between reputation and accounting information is more pronounced than 
is the substitutional relationship. Thus, the aggregate eﬀect is that a better reputation 
improves the usefulness of accounting information in debt contracts. This paper also 
provides evidence of both the substitutional and complementary relationships between 
reputation and accounting, and examines alternative implications of the reputation 
variables. When control variables for privatization type, controlling shareholder, 
differences in the information environment and accounting information quality are 
included, the prior conclusion that a stronger reputation improves the usefulness 
of accounting information in debt contracts remains unchanged. Additional tests 
show that (1) analysts’ private information weakens the complementary relationship 
between reputation and accounting information, and (2) banks require a lower degree 
of conditional conservatism from ﬁrms with a better reputation, which suggests that 
reputation substitutes for the governance role of accounting information. Moreover, 
there is weak evidence to suggest that the eﬀects of reputation are lessened as the legal 
environment improves.
In contrast to the prior literature, which focuses on the relationship between 
accounting information and formal institutions, this study investigates the relationship 
between accounting information and reputation, an informal institution, using the 
transaction cost economics framework. It also oﬀers a preliminary attempt to measure 
the reputation of family ﬁrms. China, one of the world’s largest transition economies, 
is characterized by weak formal institutions. As a result, a large number of the country’s 
1 The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewer who reminded him to clarify the meaning of “debt contract” 
in this paper.
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transactions rely on informal institutions. Such a unique setting provides numerous 
opportunities for research whose results will have important implications for the 
economic activities of other transition economies. Reputation, which is examined 
herein, is only one type of informal institution. Future studies may incorporate other 
informal institutions, such as business networks and culture, and may also investigate 
the contracts between ﬁrms and other stakeholder, including suppliers, customers and 
employees. As the restrictions on the listing of private companies in China are gradually 
being eliminated, future research may employ larger samples, compare family ﬁrms and 
non-family ﬁrms directly, and use panel data to avoid such econometrics problems as 
serial correlation, thereby allowing more accurate and credible conclusions to be reached.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses
Ali and Hwang (2000) investigate the relationship between the value relevance of 
ﬁnancial accounting data and ﬁve country-speciﬁc factors. They demonstrate that the 
value relevance of ﬁnancial reports is lower in countries in which the ﬁnancial system 
is bank-oriented rather than market-oriented; private sector bodies are not involved in 
the standard-setting process; accounting practices follow the continental model rather 
than the Anglo-American model; the degree of tax-financial reporting conformity is 
higher; and spending on auditing services is relatively limited. Ball et al. (2000) and 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine the diﬀerences in the timeliness and conditional 
conservatism of accounting earnings that are due to legal origins and the political 
economy at the country level. Leuz et al. (2003) show that firms in countries with 
developed equity markets, dispersed ownership structures, strong investor rights and good 
legal enforcement engage in less earnings management, because such countries provide 
better shareholder protection and mitigate insiders’ incentives to manage accounting 
earnings for private control benefits. Burgstahler et al. (2006) also demonstrate that 
stronger legal enforcement is associated with less earnings management in European 
ﬁrms. Chaney et al. (2008) document that the quality of earnings reported by ﬁrms with 
politically connected top executives or large shareholders is poorer. In connected ﬁrms, 
however, lower earnings quality is not associated with a higher cost of debt.
The aforementioned literature mainly focuses on how formal institutions shape 
accounting. The common conclusion is that imperfect formal institutions impair the 
quality and usefulness of accounting information. Williamson (1983) criticizes such 
“legal centralism” by arguing that, in reality, the most common way to solve contract 
disputes is not through formal institutions, but rather through the informal institutions 
that are formed by repeated games among the transaction parties and are known as 
“private order” institutions. Informal institutions can also remedy some of the defects 
of formal institutions (Lin, 1994), and it is thus meaningful to examine them. Because 
of diﬃculties in data collection (Sun et al., 2005) and the problems of omitted variables 
and measurement bias (Gul, 2006), it is diﬃcult for cross-country studies to examine 
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the eﬀects of informal institutions and the relationship between such institutions and 
accounting information. 
Anderson et al. (2003) investigate the diﬀerence in the cost of debt (measured by the 
yield to maturity of corporate bonds) between family and non-family ﬁrms in the US 
stock market and document that the cost of debt is lower for the former. They argue that 
the family’s concern for the ﬁrm’s (that is, its own) reputation provides one explanation 
for this ﬁnding. As reputation is one of the informal institutions that is characterized 
by “self-enforcement” (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979), Anderson et al. (2003), 
in eﬀect, provide evidence on the eﬀects of informal institutions. However, they fail to 
investigate how reputation is built, and consider the eﬀects of neither reputation nor 
accounting information in detail. Given Wang’s (2006) evidence that the quality of 
accounting information is better in family than non-family ﬁrms, the results reported 
by Anderson et al. (2003) may simply be the consequence of diﬀerences in such quality 
between these two types of ﬁrms. 
Transactions in transition economies tend to be heavily reliant on informal 
institutions due to their imperfect formal institutions, thus rendering an investigation of 
the relationship between accounting and informal institutions easier in such economies. 
Sun et al. (2006) examine this relationship in debt contracts in the Chinese stock 
market, and show that the difference in the usefulness of accounting information in 
these contracts between SOEs and non-SOEs is mainly due to the implicit guarantee 
of debt payment conferred by the government’s reputation for the former ﬁrms. They 
conclude that informal institutions substitute for the eﬀects of accounting information 
in debt contracts. Employing the transaction cost economics framework, this study 
shows that reputation and accounting information have both a substitutional and 
complementary relationship in debt contracts. It also oﬀers an attempt at measuring 
family ﬁrm reputation and provides direct evidence of the eﬀects of that reputation.
2.1 Reputation, Accounting Information and Debt Contracts
Accounting information can help to reduce the cost of debt contracts in two ways. 
First, accounting accruals mitigate the noise induced by matching and timing problems 
in cash ﬂows. Accruals thus better predict future cash ﬂows and better reﬂect the ﬁrm’s 
ﬁnancial condition and performance than do the current period’s cash ﬂows (Dechow, 
1994). The information produced by an accounting system is highly correlated with 
the ﬁrm’s repayment ability, thus reducing the bank’s cost in determining which ﬁrm 
to lend to and the size of the loan. Accounting thus plays an important “information 
role.” Second, because of the bounded rationality of human beings, contracts are by 
nature incomplete, that is, they are unable to deal with all possible contingencies that 
may arise in future. Rational economic agents are likely to exploit the incompleteness 
of contracts to realize gains at others’ expense; in other words, they are likely to engage 
in “opportunistic behavior.” For example, having acquired a bank loan, a firm may 
make a risky investment. The abnormal gains from that investment are realized by the 
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shareholders, whereas the losses are largely borne by the bank because of shareholders’ 
limited liability. Numerous studies following the research of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Watts (1977) have documented the fact that opportunistic behavior can be 
constrained by accounting information. Jensen and Meckling (1976) view accounting as 
playing a monitoring or guarantee role that reduces agency costs, whereas Watts (1977) 
argues that ﬁnancial statements are the product of the demand for reduced such costs. 
The agency problem between a bank and a ﬁrm refers to the problem that arises if the 
latter engages in opportunistic behavior after the former has oﬀered it a loan. The PAT 
literature also documents the widespread use of accounting information in debt contracts 
to constrain ﬁrms’ operating activities, whereas ﬁrms choose accounting policies to avoid 
such constraints (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990), thus providing indirect evidence to 
suggest that accounting information can mitigate opportunistic behavior. In this paper, I 
call this the “governance role” of accounting. 
This governance role is based on the assumption of an explicit contract that is valid 
only when all future contingencies can be expected rationally, and there is a strong 
juridical system to ensure contract enforcement (Klein et al., 1978). An accounting 
system, which is characterized by its valuation on a historical cost basis, makes only 
approximate estimates for the future (Sun et al., 2006). Even if accurate estimation 
can be reached, for a juridical system to be effective, the courts must not be at an 
informational disadvantage relative to the contracting parties (Yang and Nie, 2006). 
There are some future contingencies, however, that are common knowledge for the 
contracting parties, but unveriﬁable by the courts. In a situation of severe opportunistic 
behavior, a bank would have less demand for the information role of accounting 
information, because the post-contract opportunistic behavior changes the future 
contingencies on which the pre-contract estimation, even if highly accurate, was based, 
and such ex-ante estimation makes little sense.
Reputation, as an informal institution, is self-enforcing. As long as the present value 
of the gains from future transactions, which will be lost in the case of opportunistic 
behavior, outweigh those from present opportunistic behavior, in equilibrium no such 
behavior will occur, and there is no need for the assistance of a third party such as the 
courts. When the legal system is weak, reputation costs are lower than those arising from 
the governance role of accounting information in dealing with opportunistic behavior. 
In other words, a strong reputation can eﬀectively substitute for this governance role. 
We thus refer to this phenomenon as reputation’s substitution effect on accounting 
information. Reputation, however, provides banks with little information by which 
to evaluate a firm’s repayment ability. A good reputation ensures a firm’s willingness 
to honor a contract, but not necessarily its ability to do so. The bank must thus ﬁnd a 
way to evaluate the ﬁrm’s repayment ability. Accordingly, it will have greater demand 
for the information role of accounting information for ﬁrms with better reputations, 
which implies the existence of a complementary relationship between reputation and 
accounting information. Whether the aggregate eﬀect is substitutional or complementary 
is an empirical question. 
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 Given the poor creditor protection provided by the law and other formal institutions 
in China, it is diﬃcult for accounting information, whose governance role is dependent 
on an explicit contract, to restrict post-contract opportunistic behavior. According to 
the foregoing analysis, China’s institutional background should make it easier to observe 
reputation’s substitution for the governance role of accounting information. However, 
there may also be diﬀerences in the complementary relationship between reputation and 
the information role of accounting in diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. SOEs, for example, ﬁnd it 
easy to acquire ﬁnancial support and subsidies from the government; the government’s 
reputation thus provides an implicit guarantee of these ﬁrms’ repayment ability. As the 
government has nearly unlimited repayment ability and most major commercial banks 
in China are government-owned, banks have few concerns over repayment ability when 
they lend to SOEs. Consequently, in the case of these ﬁrms, there is a substitutional 
relationship between reputation and both the governance and information roles of 
accounting information, and thus a substitutional relationship between reputation and 
accounting information in the aggregate, which is the conclusion drawn by Sun et al. 
(2006). Non-SOEs, in contrast, have a natural link to neither state-owned banks nor 
the government’s limitless repayment ability. Accordingly, these ﬁrms’ reputation does 
not ensure their repayment ability, and hence a complementary relationship between 
reputation and accounting information is expected to be observed. Furthermore, if 
the substitution effect of a good reputation on the governance role of accounting 
information is dominated by the complementary effect of such a reputation on the 
information role of that information, then we can expect, in the aggregate, to observe 
a complementary relationship between reputation and accounting information in debt 
contracts. 
2.2 Family Ownership and Reputation
Most non-SOEs listed in the Chinese stock market are family firms (based on 













the criterion discussed in Section 3), and natural persons or families are usually their 
ultimate controlling owners. The controlling owners of such listed firms not only 
own a large share of the ﬁrms, but also hold important positions within them, such as 
directors, top executives and supervisors. Some studies suggest that controlling families 
may expropriate minority owners by separating cash flow rights and control rights 
(Classens et al., 2000). There is no justification for viewing family control only as a 
means of expropriating minority owners, however, as the latter can protect themselves 
by discounting the firm’s stock price and forcing the controlling family to bear the 
costs induced by the conﬂicts of interest between the two types of owners (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In fact, in the presence of imperfect formal institutions, concentrated 
ownership is an efficient way to lower transaction costs and increase trust between 
transaction parties (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Fan and Wong, 2002). Concentrated 
ownership grants controlling families the power to sign contracts with creditors and 
other stakeholders and greater incentives to honor those contracts, thus remedying 
the defects of the legal system, such as its inability to enforce contracts. The following 
analysis demonstrates that the incentives to honor contracts are based on reputation. In 
other words, family ownership confers ﬁrms with a reputation, which has an inﬂuence 
over the usefulness of accounting information in debt contracts.
As previously noted, the mechanism by which reputation mitigates opportunistic 
behavior in equilibrium is as follows: the present value of future gains when the contract is 
honored is greater than the gains that would be realized were it to be breached in the present 
period. Hence, there are at least three conditions that must be met for reputation to have an 
eﬀect, and family ownership can meet these conditions. First, the transaction relationship 
between the contracting parties should be a lengthy one (Klein and Leﬄer, 1981); otherwise, 
ﬁrms would not be motivated by gains from future transactions to honor the contracts. In 
family ﬁrms, the controlling families usually retain a large ownership stake, and the heritage 
of ownership ensures their long-term presence in the ﬁrm. As a result, the stakeholders of 
family ﬁrms expect to have long-term relationships with the same transaction parties, which 
may provide these ﬁrms with greater motivation to honor contracts. 
Second, the present value of gains from future transactions must be suﬃciently large 
to prevent the contracting parties from turning to opportunistic behavior to gain more. 
Both the reduction in the ﬁrm’s gains and its net cash ﬂows from future transactions due 
to opportunistic behavior are reﬂected in its stock price, which is the present value of its 
future net cash ﬂows. Should such opportunistic behavior occur, the controlling family, 
which often has a large ownership stake in the firm, would suffer significant losses. 
Moreover, the family members employed by a family firm are usually paid less than 
their counterparts in the labor market. This underpayment represents a type of deferred 
consumption, which is similar to the situation in macroeconomic models in which more 
current period outputs are turned into savings to increase the consumption available 
in the future. Thus, a reduction in gains from future transactions due to opportunistic 
behavior will also cause a reduction in the future consumption available, which reduces 
the family members’ future utility.
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Third, reputation must be diﬃcult to imitate; otherwise, it is unable to bring about 
lasting gains because of market competition for those gains (Klein et al., 1978). A family 
ﬁrm’s reputation does not adhere to the ﬁrm’s physical assets, but rather to the members 
of the controlling family. The gains resulting from reputation are thus quite diﬃcult 
to transfer to non-family members, although they can be more easily shared among 
family members through an implicit contract. Such inalienability renders a family ﬁrm’s 
reputation virtually impossible to imitate.
Although family ownership is just one way to build reputation, the foregoing 
discussion of the relationship between reputation and accounting information can be 
applied to family ﬁrms, which leads us to this study’s main hypothesis, as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: A family ﬁrm’s reputation has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the usefulness of 
accounting information in debt contracts. If the substitution eﬀect of reputation on the 
governance role of accounting information is dominated by its complementary eﬀect on 
the information role of that information, then the family ﬁrm’s reputation will, in the 
aggregate, enhance the usefulness of accounting information in bank loan contracts. If, in 
contrast, the substitution eﬀect dominates the complementary eﬀect, then the family ﬁrm’s 
reputation will diminish its usefulness in such contracts in the aggregate.
3. Research Design
We now turn to a discussion of the method used to measure a family firm’s 
reputation and accounting information, and introduce the basic model employed to test 
the hypothesis.
Most listed ﬁrms in the Chinese stock market are SOEs, which are quite diﬀerent 
from, and hence not directly comparable to, non-SOEs. I adopt the method proposed 
by Classens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) and deﬁne non-SOEs with natural 
persons or a family as their ultimate controlling owners as family ﬁrms. By this criterion, 
most listed non-SOEs in China are family ﬁrms. It was quite diﬃcult to classify the 
remaining non-family ﬁrms, most of which are owned by collectives or townships and 
are quasi-family controlled. I thus confined the sample to family firms that can be 
identiﬁed by their ultimate controlling owners. I then constructed variables to measure 
the three aforementioned conditions for a family ﬁrm’s reputation to have an eﬀect.2  
2 Because this study’s sample is confined to family firms, it was necessary to construct variables to measure 
the magnitude of these ﬁrms’ reputation, which may be subjective and inaccurate. For example, the way in 
which I determined whether members of the controlling family were employed as top management may have 
underestimated the inﬂuence of family members. Comparing family ﬁrms and non-family ﬁrms directly may 
avoid the construction of reputation variables, as it requires only the identiﬁcation of family ﬁrms. There are 
commonly agreed ways of identifying family ﬁrms, which would enhance the credibility of the conclusions 
drawn herein.
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The first condition requires repeated games over a long period of time, which I 
measured indirectly because of the diﬃculty in conﬁrming the founding date of family 
ﬁrms. Wang and Zhou (2006) split Chinese listed family ﬁrms into founding and non-
founding family firms. A founding family firm must fulfill at least one of the three 
following conditions. (1) It went public through an initial public oﬀering (IPO); (2) 
it went public by purchasing a controlling stake in a listed ﬁrm, and then injected the 
assets of its business into a shell ﬁrm as the prime operating business of the new ﬁrm; or (3) 
it was a non-family listed ﬁrm, but became family-owned after a management buyout 
(MBO), and the new controlling owners or their family members have been board 
directors, top executives or supervisors since the ﬁrm was listed. The prime operating 
business of a founding family ﬁrm was created by the family. As the ﬁrm makes frequent 
deals with stakeholders, its reputation grows along with its business. A non-founding 
family ﬁrm usually goes public through the takeover of an SOE and leaves the prime 
operating business, which is often different from the business created by the family, 
unchanged. The reputation built up by the family is probably business- or industry-
specific, and thus cannot be transferred to a new business, industry or stakeholders. 
Hence, founding family ﬁrms are expected to enjoy a better reputation than their non-
founding family counterparts. This study employs the dummy variable founder to 
distinguish founding and non-founding family ﬁrms.3
According to our second condition, the gains from future transactions must be larger 
than those from current opportunistic behavior. As it is diﬃcult to measure the latter 
gains, I measured only the gains from future transactions approximately by employing 
the cash ﬂow rights of the controlling family (cr) and their market value (mvalue).4 I 
assumed that the gains from future transactions are the future cash ﬂows of the ﬁrm. On 
the one hand, the greater the cash ﬂow rights the controlling family has, the larger the 
losses in the gains from future transactions will be. On the other hand, the greater the 
market value of ownership, which is the present value of future cash ﬂows, the larger the 
losses the family will suﬀer. 
The third condition requires a family firm’s reputation to adhere to the family 
members; hence, it cannot be shared by managers outside the controlling family. 
Consequently, the effects of reputation will be more pronounced if members of the 
controlling family serve as board directors, top executives or supervisors. Moreover, these 
family members have greater incentives to build and maintain the firm’s reputation, 
which is quite important if that reputation is to have any eﬀect. I thus employed the 
dummy variable inboard to identify whether any members of the controlling family 
served as board directors, top executives or supervisors.
To consider the impacts of the three conditions s imultaneously, I a lso 
constructed two comprehensive variables combine1 and combine2. Combine1 equals 
founder*inboard*cr and combine2 equals founder*inboard*mvalue.
3 See Table 2 for deﬁnitions of the variables.
4 The parentheses contain the names of the variables.
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In line with Sun et al. (2006), I also adopted 10 accounting measures: current ratio 
(current), acid-test ratio (acid), cash ratio (cratio), equity ratio (eratio), interest coverage 
(cover), liquidation value ratio (liquid), gross proﬁt margin (oi), return on equity (roe), 
return on assets (roa) and asset turnover (turnover). These measures are widely used 
by banks in their loan decisions. Using factor analysis, I also extracted a few common 
factors from these 10 measures to retain the information contained within them but, 
at the same time, mitigate any multicollinearity stemming from the high degree of 
correlation between them. Factor analysis resulted in two common factors, factor1 and 
factor2, based on the requirement that the eigenvalues are greater than 1 (see Section 5 
for further details of the factor analysis).
The following model, which was proposed by Sun et al. (2006), was used to test 
Hypothesis 1.
newloant = ß1 factor1t-1 + ß2 factor2t-1 + ß3 rept + ß4 rept* factor1t-1 + ß5 rept* factor2t-1
+ ß6 lnsizet-1 + ß7 growt + ß8 cﬁot + ß9 oﬀert + Industry & Year Dummies 
+ Constant (1)
Interest rates have not yet been liberalized in China. Banks can adjust the loan 
amount, but not its interest rate, according to the borrower’s repayment ability and 
risk level. Consequently, I used each year’s newly obtained bank loans (newloan) to 
measure a listed company’s ability to borrow from banks, in other words, the amount 
that banks are willing to lend to it. This measure, however, also reﬂects the diﬀerence 
between ﬁrms in their demand for bank loans. Although my empirical tests focus on 
the interaction terms of the reputation and accounting information measures, which 
are unlikely to be influenced by this difference, I also added proxies for bank loan 
demand as control variables. In the primary analysis, again based on Sun et al. (2006), I 
employed operating revenue growth (grow),  the retained cash ﬂow ratio (cﬁo) and cash 
ﬂows from a seasoned equity oﬀering (oﬀer) to control for this demand approximately, 
whereas additional control variables were included in robustness tests. rep in model 
(1) represents a family ﬁrm’s reputation, and includes the variables founder, cr, mvalue, 
inboard, combine1 and combine2. According to Hypothesis 1, a family ﬁrm’s reputation 
has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the usefulness of accounting information in debt contracts; 
thus, the expectation was that ß4 and ß5 would be statistically signiﬁcant. Further, if the 
substitution eﬀect of reputation on the governance role of accounting information is 
dominated by its complementary eﬀect on the information role of that information, 
then ß4 and ß5 should be statistically greater than zero. If, in contrast, the substitution 
effect dominates the complementary effect, then ß4 and ß5 should be statistically less 
than zero. The industry and year dummy variables in model (1) are designated “Industry 
& Year dummies.” Industry classification is based on the two-digit China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSCR) industry classification code for the manufacturing 
industry and the one-digit code for other industries.
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4. Sample Selection
Most publicly traded companies in China do not disclose their ultimate controlling 
owners and the pyramidal ownership structure until 2004. To obtain sufficient 
information by which to identify family ﬁrms and to calculate the cash ﬂow rights of 
the controlling owners, I chose 2004-2007 as the sample period. Sample selection began 
by collecting the names of all companies that issued A-shares on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges and had natural persons or families as their controlling owners 
between 2004 and 2007. I then deleted ﬁrm-year observations according to the criteria 
presented in Table 1 to obtain a ﬁnal sample of 1,058 ﬁrm-year observations. Financial 
and stock market data were obtained from the Wind and China Center for Economic 
Research (CCER) systems. Information on ultimate controllers was obtained from the 
corporate governance database in the CCER system. Information on the presence of the 
ultimate owners and their family members among the ﬁrms’ top management, as well as 
their cash ﬂow and control rights, was manually collected from the sample companies’ 
financial reports and other public disclosures. I applied the method proposed by 
Classens et al. (2000) to calculate cash ﬂow and control rights. For the recent IPO family 
ﬁrms (especially IPOs after 2004), I was able to collect the relevant top management 
information from the companies’ prospectuses, and there was usually little change over 
the sample period. When there were changes in a company’s top management during 
this period, I used the Wind system and an Internet search to determine whether these 
changes were related to the controlling owner’s family. For companies that had gone 
public through an IPO a long time ago or had become family-owned through a M&A, 
I ﬁrst searched the “information on the board of directors and the management” in the 
Wind system and then looked for “basic information on current directors, top executives 
and supervisors” in the companies’ annual reports, followed by an Internet search if the 
preceding search failed to conﬁrm kinship between a member of top management and 
the controlling owners. If all of these searches failed, then I identiﬁed this person as a 
non-member of the given controlling owner’s family. As this search process may have 
missed some family members among the top management of the sample companies, 
I did not measure the number of such family members. Instead, as long as one family 
member was conﬁrmed to be employed as a top manager, I set the dummy inboard to 1.
Table 1. Sample Selection
Select ﬁrms (1) that are listed in the 2004-2007 period, (2) have natural persons or families 
as controlling owners, (3) whose listing status was not terminated or suspended in the 
corresponding year, and (4) whose controlling owners can exert actual control (the control 
rights of the ultimate owners are greater than 10%; ﬁrms with controlling owners arrested in the 
corresponding year are deleted). 
1,562
Exclude ﬁrms in their ﬁrst year when listed through an IPO or M&A. 299
Exclude ﬁrms issuing B or H shares. 71
Exclude observations with missing data needed to estimate model (1). 134
Firm-year observations in the ﬁnal sample. 1,058
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Table 2. Deﬁnitions of Main Variables
Variable Deﬁnition 
current current ratio = current assets/ current liabilities
cratio cash ratio = (year-end cash and cash equivalents)/current liabilities
cover interest coverage = (net income + income tax + ﬁnancial expense)/interest expense 
oi gross proﬁt margin = operating revenue - operating costs/ operating revenue
roa return on assets = (net income + ﬁnancial expense)/average total assets
asid acid-test ratio = (current assets - inventory)/current liabilities
eratio equity ratio = total equity/total assets
liquid liquidation value ratio = total debt/(total equity - intangible assets - deferred income tax) 
roe return on equity = net income/ average total equity
turnover asset turnover = operating revenue/average total assets
founder dummy that equals 1 for a founding-family ﬁrm and 0 otherwise (see Wang and Zhou’s research design (2006) or that in this paper for further details)
inboard dummy that equals 1 if a member of the controlling family is a board director, top executive or supervisor
cr controlling owners’ cash ﬂow rights calculated using the method described in Classens et al. (2000)
mvalue natural logarithm of the market value of the listed company’s outstanding A-shares multiplied by the controlling owners’ cash ﬂow rights
combine1 combination equaling  founder * inboard * cr
combine2 combination equaling  founder * inboard * mvalue
factor1 common factor representing a ﬁrm’s repayment ability
factor2 common factor representing a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability
newloan
newly obtained bank loans = (bank loans at the end of the year - bank loans at the 
beginning of the year)/total assets at the beginning of the year, with bank loans being the 
sum of long-term loans, short-term loans and long-term loans due within the year
lnsize natural logarithm of total assets
cﬁo retained cash ﬂow ratio = (net amount of cash ﬂow generated from operating activities - net amount of cash ﬂow generated from investing activities)/total assets at the beginning of the year
grow operating revenue growth rate
oﬀer cash ﬂow from seasoned equity oﬀering/total assets at the beginning of the year
follow natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts making earnings forecasts for year t or recommendations in year t, ie, log(1+number of analysts)
riskt
standard deviation of monthly abnormal returns from May of year t-1 to April of year 
t+15 (monthly abnormal returns are the monthly return adjusted by dividends minus the 
monthly return of the Shanghai or Shenzhen A-share index, depending on which exchange 
the company is listed on)
eps earnings per share = net income/total shares outstanding at the end of the year
ACCRUAL total accruals = net income - net cash ﬂows generated from operating activities 
CFO net cash ﬂows generated from operating activities




The results of factor analysis on the 10 accounting variables deﬁned in Section 4 are 
presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3. Eigenvalues of the Common Factors and the Cumulated Variance Explained by These 
Factors




Table 4. Factor Loadings and Factor Scores
Factor loading Factor score
factor1 factor2 factor1 factor2
acid 0.8877 -0.2998 0.31078 -0.22167
current 0.8869 -0.2204 0.18384 -0.11018
liquid 0.8572 -0.2684 0.21106 -0.18303
cratio 0.8325 -0.1885 0.09331 -0.06822
eratio 0.8063 -0.0442 0.13220 0.01156
roa 0.5477 0.7476 0.21259 0.61705
roe 0.4597 0.7400 0.06215 0.31035
cover 0.4355 0.1370 0.02751 0.03262
oi 0.2615 0.0419 0.00323 -0.05861
turnover 0.1623 0.3938 -0.00699 0.07222
As can be seen in Table 3, the eigenvalues of the ﬁrst two common factors are greater 
than 1, whereas that of the third is only 0.65. As this study requires that eigenvalues 
be greater than 1, only factor1 and factor2 were retained for further analysis. These two 
common factors explain 92% of the variance in the 10 accounting variables, and most 
of the information incorporated in these variables is reserved. The ﬁrst, that is, factor1, 
has greater factor loading on variables acid, liquid, cratio and eratio, which indicate 
repayment ability, whereas the second, factor2, has greater such loading on variables roa 
and roe, which indicate proﬁtability. 
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5.2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables.
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables
Variable Mean Standard deviation Median 
current 1.37 0.88 1.18
acid 0.97 0.78 0.80
liquid 0.99 1.13 0.67
turnover 0.63 0.54 0.53
 roe 0.04 2.46 0.06
roa 0.04 0.09 0.05
cover 17.13 150.51 3.41
eratio 0.54 0.19 0.55
newloan 0.03 0.16 0.01
factor1 0.00 0.98 -0.19
factor2 0.00 0.93 0.20
lnsize 11.67 0.82 11.66
cﬁo 0.11 0.17 0.09
grow 4.23 116.98 14.25
oﬀer 0.02 0.08 0.00
founder 0.73 0.45 1.00
inboard 0.78 0.42 1.00
cr 22.57 14.36 20.12
mvalue 10.23 1.33 10.16
combine1 16.45 17.12 13.16
combine2 6.50 4.95 9.42
Table 6 is the correlation matrix of the main variables. We can see from this matrix 
that cr and mvalue are highly correlated (0.648), which indicates that they have a 
substantial amount of information in common, and it is thus reasonable to use them 
to measure the second condition for a family ﬁrm’s reputation to have an eﬀect. Except 
for founder and inboard, the correlations between the individual reputation variables are 
below 0.3, which implies that they separately reﬂect diﬀerent aspects of reputation. The 
correlations between the two comprehensive reputation variables and the four individual 
variables are almost all greater than 0.5, which implies that there is little loss in 
information when combine1 and combine2 are constructed through multiplication. The 
correlations between the other independent variables in model (1) are below 0.3, with 
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5.3. Main Results
All of the continuous variables used in the following regression models are winsorized 
at the top and bottom 1% levels.
5.3.1. Estimation and Explanation of Model (1)
The regression results for model (1) are presented in Table 7. The coeﬃcients of the 
interaction terms between the reputation variables and the accounting variables, rep*factor1 
and rep*factor2, are greater than 0 when all of the reputation variables, namely, founder, 
inboard, cr, mvalue, combine1 and combine2, are included. In most cases, the interactions 
are both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Take ß5 in Column 1 of Table 7 as an 
example. When cr increases from the ﬁrst quartile (11.86) to the third quartile (29.43), 
it improves the eﬀect of factor2 by 62%. The model (1) results show that a family ﬁrm’s 
reputation improves the usefulness of accounting information in debt contracts, which 
implies that the substitution eﬀect of a family ﬁrm’s reputation on such information is 
weaker than its complementary effect, which is in line with the discussion in Section 
2. To examine the three aforementioned reputation conditions, most of the following 
analysis considers the results for combine1 and combine2, rather than those for each of the 
individual reputation variables, that is, founder, inboard, cr and mvalue.
Table 7. How Reputation Influences the Usefulness of Accounting Information in Debt 
Contracts: Estimation Results of Model (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dep.= newloan newloan newloan newloan newloan newloan
rep= cash rights founder board mvalue combine1 combine2
factor1 0.0176*** 0.0100* 0.0091* 0.0057 0.0146*** 0.0083**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.031) (0.004) (0.004)
factor2 0.0142** 0.0138*** 0.0190*** -0.0334 0.0179*** 0.0168***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.028) (0.004) (0.004)
rep 0.0004* 0.0248*** 0.0227*** 0.0066* 0.0004* 0.0023***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001)
rep*factor1 0.0001 0.0128* 0.0150** 0.0014 0.0003 0.0019***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
rep*factor2 0.0005** 0.0181*** 0.0084 0.0061** 0.0005*** 0.0017***
(0.000) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant -0.0046 -0.0248 -0.0296 -0.0143 -0.0030 -0.0086
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-square 0.139 0.146 0.141 0.138 0.144 0.151
F-stat 7.20 7.71 7.10 7.28 7.71 7.88
Obs 1,058 1,058 1,058 1,058 1,058 1,058
Note:  Control variables include lnsize, grow, cﬁo and oﬀer. White-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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5.3.2. Alternative Explanations
5.3.2.1. Do the Reputation Variables Have Other Implications?
Our deﬁnition of founding family ﬁrms is likely to imply the type of privatization: 
IPO or M&A. To address the impact this possibility may have on the results, I used 
founder as the reputation variable and added variables IPO, IPO*factor1 and IPO*factor2 
to model (1). The dummy IPO equals 1 if the company went public via an IPO and 0 
otherwise. The results of this alternative, which are shown in Column 1 of Table 8A, do 
not change the conclusions in Table 7.
In addition, differences in cr may reflect differences in the way that controlling 
owners control listed companies, as it is common for listed family ﬁrms in China to be 
controlled through a pyramidal or cross-holding structure, which dilutes the cash ﬂow 
rights of the ultimate owners. To address this concern, variables indicating diﬀerent types 
of control, pyramid, pyramid*factor1 and pyramid*factor2, were included in model (1). 
The dummy pyramid equals 1 if the company is controlled through a pyramidal or cross-
holding structure and 0 otherwise. The results are shown in Column 2 of Table 8A, from 
which it can be seen that they fail to change the conclusions in Table 7.
Table 8A. Do the Reputation Variables Have Other Implications?
(1) (2)
dep.= newloan newloan

























Control Variables Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Adj. R-square 0.145 0.138
F-stat 7.60 6.64
Obs 1,058 1,058
Note: Control variables include lnsize, grow, cﬁo and oﬀer. White-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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I next investigated whether the reputation variables reﬂect diﬀerences in companies’ 
information environment, which would have an impact on the usefulness of accounting 
information in debt contracts. I adopted the quality of the accounting ﬁrm employed by 
a listed company and the number of analysts who follow that company to proxy for its 
information environment. High-quality auditing improves the credibility of a company’s 
ﬁnancial reports, thus increasing the usefulness of accounting information (in terms of 
both its information and governance roles) in debt contracts. Analysts enhance company 
transparency by collecting and diﬀusing private information (Bushman et al., 2004), 
which can serve as a substitute for publicly disclosed accounting information. I judged 
accounting firm quality by the “Information on Comprehensive Evaluation of Top 
100 Accounting Firms” published annually by the Chinese Institute of Certiﬁed Public 
Accountants (CICPA).6 The dummy top10 equals 1 if the company employed a Top 10 
accounting ﬁrm in year t or year t-1 and 0 otherwise.7 Analysts were considered if they 
made earnings forecasts for year t or recommendations in year t. The variable follow is 
deﬁned as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts in year t. The impact 
of the information environment was then addressed through the following model.
newloant = ß1 factor1t-1 + ß2 factor2t-1 + ß3 rept + ß4 rept* factor1t-1 + ß5 rept* factor2t-1
+ß6 infot + ß7 infot* factor1t-1 + ß8 infot* factor2t-1 + ß9 ln sizet-1 + ß10 growt 
+ß11 cfiot + ß12 oﬀert + Industry & Year Dummies + Constant  (2)
 In model (2), the variable info is replaced by top10 and follow. The results of this 
model are presented in Columns 1 to 4 of Table 8B, and leave the conclusions in Table 7 
unchanged.
6 The criteria used by the CICPA for evaluation and ranking include total revenue, number of certiﬁed public 
accountants (CPAs), completion of continuous professional development (CPD), number of candidates 
enrolled in the professional talent pool and penalties. 
7 I did not use the “Big Four” as the criterion for measuring the quality of accounting ﬁrms because too few 
ﬁrms in my sample employed one of the “Big Four.” 
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Table 8B. Do the Reputation Variables Reﬂect Diﬀerences in the Information Environment?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dep.= newloan newloan newloan newloan
rep= combine1 combine1 combine2 combine2
info= follow top10 follow top10
factor1 0.0196*** 0.0136*** 0.0138*** 0.0076*
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
factor2 0.0129*** 0.0185*** 0.0128*** 0.0170***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
rep 0.0003 0.0004** 0.0020*** 0.0024***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
rep*factor1 0.0004** 0.0003 0.0022*** 0.0019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
rep*factor2 0.0004** 0.0005*** 0.0013* 0.0018***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
info 0.0099** -0.0079 0.0085** -0.0103
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011)
info*factor1 -0.0083** 0.0069 -0.0082** 0.0063
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009)
info*factor2 0.0040    -0.0057 0.0039 -0.0050
(0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Constant 0.0722 -0.0077 0.0566 -0.0131
(0.056) (0.051) (0.056) (0.051)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
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5.3.2.2 Do Companies with Stronger Reputations Have Higher-quality Accounting 
Information? 
If companies with stronger reputations have better-quality accounting information, 
then we would observe a greater degree of usefulness in the accounting information 
of these companies in debt contracts. To consider this possibility, I next investigated 
whether the results in Table 7 are driven by diﬀerences in accounting information quality 
through conditional conservatism and discretionary accruals. 
I added reputation variables and the control variables lnsize, age and risk to the Basu 
(1997) model, following He et al. (2008), Sun et al. (2005) and Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005). Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the company was 
listed. The Basu model becomes: 
EPSt-1 = ß1 RETt-1 + ß2 DRETt-1 + ß3 RETt-1* DRETt-1 + ß4 rept + ß5 rept* RETt-1  Pt-2 
 + ß6 rept* DRETt-1 + ß7 rept* RETt-1* DRETt-1 + ∑ ( ß8,k control 
 + ß9,k control* RETt-1 + ß10,k control* DRETt-1 + ß11,k control* RETt-1* DRETt-1)
 + Industry & Year  Dummies + Constant   (3)
In model (3), RETt-1 is the monthly compound return adjusted by the market return 
from May of year t-1 to April of year t, namely, RETt-1 = ∏ (1+(retT-j - mretT-j )), where ret 
is the raw return of a company and T is April of year t. The market return, mret, is the 
return of the Shanghai or Shenzhen A-share index, depending on the exchange on which 
the company is listed. DRET is a dummy that equals 1 if RETt-1 < 0 and 0 otherwise. 
The results of model (3) are shown in Columns 1 and 2 of  Table 9A. We can see that
ß7 <0, which suggests that companies with a better reputation have an insigniﬁcantly 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
dep.= newloan newloan newloan newloan
rep= combine1 combine1 combine2 combine2
info= follow top10 follow top10
Adj. R-square 0.152 0.143 0.157 0.149
F-stat 7.63 7.08 7.61 7.25
Obs 1,058 1,058 1,058 1,058
Note:  Control variables include lnsize, grow, cﬁo and oﬀer. White-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9A. Reputation and Conditional Conservatism – the Basu (1997) Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dep.= EPS/P EPS/P EPS/P EPS/P
rep= combine1 combine2 combine1 combine2
RET 0.3219 0.3252 0.3507 0.3634
(0.418) (0.421) (0.413) (0.415)
RET*DRET 0.0814 0.0842 0.0704 0.0643
(0.535) (0.535) (0.518) (0.521)
DRET 0.1524 0.1583 0.1643 0.1720
(0.118) (0.119) (0.115) (0.116)
rep -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0006
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
rep*DRET 0.0001 0.0012 0.0001 0.0014
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
rep*RET*DRET -0.0024 -0.0079 -0.0026 -0.0077
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
rep*RET 0.0002 0.0009 0.0005 0.0016











Constant -0.1505* -0.1495* -0.1549* -0.1565*
(0.087) (0.087) (0.085) (0.086)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
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From the second half of 2006 to the end of 2007, the Chinese stock market 
experienced a boom. To address concerns over irrational stock price movements in a bull 
market, I also adopted the following Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model, which does not 
use stock price data, and repeated the conditional conservatism test.
ACCRUALt-1 = ß1 CFOt-1 + ß2 DCFOt-1 + ß3 CFOt-1* DCFOt-1 + ß4 rept + ß5 rept*  CFOt-1
+ ß6 rept* DCFOt-1 + ß7 rept* CFOt-1* DCFOt-1 + ∑ (ß8,k control
+ ß9,k control* CFOt-1 + ß10,k control* DCFOt-1 +ß11,k control* CFOt-1* 
DCFOt-1) + Industry & Year Dummies + Constant  (4)
 
In model (4), DCFO is a dummy that equals 1 if CFOt-1 - CFOt-2 < 0 and 0 
otherwise. ACCRUAL and CFO are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
year. The control variables are the same as those in model (3). Model (4) assumes a 
positive correlation between cash ﬂows in the current period and those in the future, 
which renders reasonable the substitution of a change in current period cash ﬂows for 
stock returns to reflect the change in future economic income. Further, conditional 
conservatism is reﬂected through accruals, which suggests a positive correlation between 
accruals and a negative change in current period cash flows (and predicts a negative 
change in future cash ﬂows). The results of model (4), which are shown in Columns 1 
and 2 of Table 9B, suggest that companies with better reputations have an insigniﬁcantly 
higher degree of conservatism. The combined results of models (3) and (4) lead to 
the conclusion that there is no strong evidence to suggest that companies with better 
reputations have a higher degree of conditional conservatism.
k=1,2,3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dep.= EPS/P EPS/P EPS/P EPS/P
rep= combine1 combine2 combine1 combine2
Adj. R-square 0.253 0.262 0.290 0.296
F-stat 6.15 6.38 6.75 6.86
Obs 1,037 1,037 1,037 1,037
Note: Control variables include lnsize, age and risk and their interactions with RET and DRET. White-adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
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Table 9B.  Reputation and Conditional Conservatism – Ball and Shivakumar(2005) Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dep.= ACCRUAL ACCRUAL ACCRUAL ACCRUAL
rep= combine1 combine2 combine1 combine2
CFO 0.3790 0.3627 0.3990 0.3750
(0.700) (0.703) (0.692) (0.694)
CFO*DCFO -0.2344 -0.3089 -0.4510 -0.6390
(1.001) (1.010) (0.950) (0.970)
DCFO 0.1460 0.1569 0.1541 0.1618
(0.112) (0.112) (0.108) (0.108)
rep 0.0008*** 0.0033*** 0.0006** 0.0027***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
rep*DCFO -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0012
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
rep*DCFO*CFO 0.0003 0.0114 0.0015 0.0122
(0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.014)
rep*CFO -0.0032 -0.0154** -0.0023 -0.0109











Constant -0.2068** -0.2052** -0.2018** -0.2004**
(0.099) (0.099) (0.097) (0.097)
Control Variable Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-square 0.591 0.594 0.616 0.618
F-stat 59.92 59.35 65.86 62.35
Obs 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057
Note: Control variables include lnsize, age and risk and their interactions with CFO and DCFO. White-adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.
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I next employed discretionary accruals calculated on the basis of the Jones (1991) 
model to measure accounting quality. Based on Xia’s (2003) recommendation, I adopted 
operating income (EBX1t-1 ) as the dependent variable to estimate the following model 
separately for each industry.8  
 
EBXIt-1 = ß1         
1      + ß2  
SALESt-1 + ß3     
PPEt-1  + Year Dummy 
SIZEt-2               SIZEt-2                  SIZEt-2                   SIZEt-2 
  (5)
In model (5), SALESt-1 is the diﬀerence in sales in years t-1 and t-2, and PPEt-1 is the 
original value of property, plant and equipment. The ﬁtted values from model (5) are 
deﬁned as normal accruals (NA). ACCRUAL, which indicates total accruals, equals net 
income minus CFO, whereas discretionary accruals (DA) equals the absolute value of 
ACCRUAL minus NA. I split combine1 into two sub-groups based on its median and 
determined, via the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, whether there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence 
in the medians and means of these two sub-groups. The same tests were applied to 
combine2, and the results are shown in Table 9C. Although companies with a stronger 
reputation have lower discretionary accruals, and the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 10% 
level in the case of combine2, the conclusions in Table 7 remain unaltered when DA is 
added to model (1) as an additional control variable (not reported). 
Table 9C. Reputation and Discretionary Accruals – Jones (1991) Model
Discretionary accruals
Mean Median 
Full sample 0.065 0.048
combine1 less than its median 0.067 0.050
combine1 greater than its median 0.063 0.046
DIFF 0.004 0.004
Mann-Whitney z-stat/Chi-square 1.100 0.864
combine2 less than its median 0.068 0.051
combine2 greater than its median 0.062 0.045
DIFF 0.006 0.006
Mann-Whitney z-stat/Chi-square 1.676* 3.010*
Note:  The diﬀerence in means and medians is determined via the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The statistics for the mean test 
are Whitney z-stats, whereas those for the median are Chi-square. ***, ** and * denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
8 The industry classiﬁcation is the same as that in model (1). Observations from the mining industry, electric 
power, steam and hot water production and supply industry, and the communication and cultural industry 
were fewer than 10 each, and a total of 16 observations from these industries were deleted.
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5.3.3. Additional Tests
5.3.3.1. Complementary Relationship between Reputation and the Information Role 
of Accounting
Analysts boost firm transparency by collecting and diffusing private information 
(Bushman et al., 2004). The forecasts they make of a company’s future operational 
and ﬁnancial condition are helpful in assessing that company’s repayment ability, thus 
substituting for the information role of accounting information to a certain extent. If 
the greater-than-zero coeﬃcients of rep*factor, as we have seen in Table 7, reﬂects the 
complementary relationship between reputation and the information role of accounting 
information, then analysts’ private information will impair this relationship. If rep*factor 
coeﬃcients greater than zero reﬂect the complementary relationship between reputation 
and the information role of accounting information, then analysts’ private information 
will impair this relationship. This argument was tested through the following model.
newloant = ß1 factor1t-1 + ß2 factor2t-1 + ß3 rept + ß4 rept* factor1t-1 + ß5 rept* factor2t-1
+ ß6 rept* factor1t-1* analystt + ß7 rept* factor2t-1* analystt + ß8 analystt 
+ ß9 analystt* rept + ß10 analystt* factor1t-1 + ß11 analystt * factor2t-1
+ Contol Variables + Industry & Year Dummies + Constant                    (6)
 
If analysts’ private information impairs the aforementioned complementary 
relationship, then ß6 and ß7 in model (6) will be negative. The results of this model are 
shown in Table 10, from which it can be seen that the coeﬃcients of analyst*rep*factor1 
and analyst*rep*factor2 are negative, as expected, with that of the former reaching 
statistical signiﬁcance. 
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Table 10. Inﬂuence of Analysts’ Private Information on the Complementary Relationship  






















analyst* factor1 0.0015 -0.0009
(0.005) (0.005)




Control Variables Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Adj. R-square 0.156 0.157
F-stat 7.34 7.05
Obs 1,058 1,058
Note:  Control variables include lnsize, grow,  cﬁo and oﬀer. White-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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5.3.3.2. Substitution of Reputation for the Governance role of Accounting Information
The substitution of reputation for the governance role of accounting information 
was tested directly through conditional conservatism, as the practice of conditional 
conservatism is shaped to a large degree by creditors’ demand (Ball, 2001). Companies’ 
gains and losses have an asymmetric impact on banks, as the latter must bear the 
consequences of the former’s failure to repay their debts due to losses, although 
they do not share in any gains beyond the interest payments. To mitigate ex post 
opportunistic behavior, banks can require timelier accounting reports to ensure the 
disclosure of expected economic losses. If reputation can substitute for the governance 
role of accounting information, then banks should have less demand for conditional 
conservatism. To test this argument, I added newloan*DRET*RET*rep to model 
(3) and newloan*DCFO*CFO*rep to model (4). If reputation can substitute for the 
aforementioned governance role, then the coefficients of newloan*DRET*RET*rep in 
model (3) and newloan*DCFO*CFO*rep in model (4) should be signiﬁcantly negative. 
The results, which are shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 9A and 9B, show that the 
coeﬃcient of newloan*DCFO*CFO*rep is indeed signiﬁcantly negative, which provides 
at least partial evidence of reputation’s ability to serve as a substitute for the governance 
role of accounting information.9 
5.3.3.3. Impact of Legal System
There are great diﬀerences in the legal environment across provinces and districts in 
China. If the legal system can protect creditors in a cost-eﬀective manner, then the eﬀect 
of reputation on opportunistic behavior, as well as the substitution and complementary 
eﬀect between reputation and accounting information, will be less pronounced. ß4 and 
ß5 in model (1) are expected to be closer to zero when the legal system in the province 
in which a listed ﬁrm is registered is more eﬃcient. I used two sets of data to measure 
the provincial-level legal environment. The ﬁrst set comes from the legal system index 
in the “NERI Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces” by Fan et al. (2007), with 
data available up to 2005. The second set comes from the rule of law index published by 
the World Bank in 2007. Because neither set of data matches this study’s sample period, 
and the two sets cannot be compared to each other, I used the values from the data to 
determine the legal environment of the provinces and then divided the provinces into 
sub-groups, rather than directly using the original values. More speciﬁcally, I averaged 
the 2004 and 2005 legal indexes for each province based on the ﬁrst set of data and 
9 It should be noted that models (3) and (4) estimate the relationship between last year’s earnings conservatism 
and the current year’s newly obtained loans, rather than the relationship between current-year earnings 
conservatism and current-year newly obtained loans. I structured them in this way because, when observing 
the weaker positive correlation between current-year conditional conservatism and newly obtained loans, it is 
impossible to distinguish whether ﬁrms reduce their conservatism ex post opportunistically or banks require 
less conservatism from ﬁrms with a stronger. 
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sorted them accordingly. As the second data set contained only 2007 data, I employed 
the original values to sort the provinces by legal environment. Most studies split the 
original sample by the median of a variable, but this method was considered possibly 
inappropriate in this study, as most of the listed ﬁrms in the sample were registered in 
provinces with a strong legal system. Thus, there would have been too few observations 
in the weak legal system sub-group if the sample had been divided by the median of the 
legal index. To balance the number of observations in each sub-group, I further divided 
the provinces in the strong legal system. The result was three sub-groups: strongest legal 
system (ﬁve provinces), weaker legal system (10 provinces) and weakest legal system (16 
provinces). The number of observations in each sub-group is as follows. 
The results of model (1) estimated by these sub-groups are presented in Tables 11A 
and 11B, from which it can be seen that only two coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant 
in the strongest legal system sub-group, whereas three are signiﬁcant in the other two. 
Using Fan et al.’s index, I ﬁnd that the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients in 
the second sub-group, that is, the provinces with a weaker legal system, are greatest (except 
for combine2*factor1). Using the World Bank index, in contrast, results in the third sub-
group (the provinces with the weakest legal system) having coeﬃcients of the greatest 
magnitude and signiﬁcance. The average of the coeﬃcients in the second and third sub-
groups is higher than that in the ﬁrst sub-group in four out of eight cases. To summarize, 
I obtained only weak evidence of any substitution between a province’s legal system and 
ﬁrm reputation. Such a system’s impact on reputation is not monotonic, which may be 
due to the way in which I split the sample. It is also possible that the indexes themselves 
are problematic.





Fan et al. 472 348 253
World Bank 379 321 358










combine1*factor1 0.0003 0.0009** 0.0003 0.0006
combine1*factor2 0.0004 0.0012*** 0.0007* 0.001
combine2*factor1 0.0033*** 0.0019 0.0007 0.0013
combine2*factor2 0.0012 0.0032** 0.0010 0.0021
Note:  Coeﬃcients are the estimation results of model (1). ***, ** and * denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively.
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5.4 . Robustness Tests
5.4.1. Serial Correlation Across Years
It is possible that ﬁrms’ newly acquired bank loans in consecutive years are serially 
correlated.10 The three following methods were employed to deal with this problem.11 
First, I added newly acquired bank loans in the previous year (newloan_1) as an 
additional control variable to model (1).12 Second, I regressed model (1) year by year. 
The coeﬃcients of the interaction terms between the reputation variables and factor1 
and factor2 remained positive. When I adopted combine1 as the reputation variable, 
the interaction terms between combine1 and factor2 were signiﬁcant in every year except 
2005, which is consistent with the results reported in Table 7. When I adopted combine2 
as the reputation variable, the interaction terms were insigniﬁcant in 2004 and 2005, 
but signiﬁcant in 2006 and 2007 at the 10% level. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients 
estimated year by year are similar to those reported in Table 7 (except for 2005), but 
with much higher standard deviations, possibly due to the sharply reduced number of 
observations in the year-by-year regressions or to serial correlation, which cannot be 
excluded. Third, Newey-West adjustment was applied to the standard errors estimated 
from model (1). In summary, none of the three alternative estimation methods alters the 
results presented in Table 7.










combine1*factor1 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004
combine1*factor2 0.0006 0.0002 0.0008** 0.0005
combine2*factor1 0.0038*** 0.0011 0.0016 0.0014
combine2*factor2 0.0011 0.0009 0.0026** 0.0018
Note:  Coeﬃcients are the estimation results of model (1). ***, ** and * denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively.
10 The author thanks the anonymous reviewer who pointed out this problem. For example, if a ﬁrm obtained 
a large number of bank loans in the previous year, then it is unlikely to obtain many in the current year due 
to banks’ concerns over risk control. Thus, there may be a negative relationship between loans obtained in 
consecutive years.
11 It is ideal to handle serial correlation by using panel data. In this study, however, the construction of panel data 
would have resulted in the deletion of half the sample, possibly causing severe survival bias and selection bias. 
This limitation may be addressed by future researchers.
12  Some observations were deleted due to missing data when calculating newloan_1.  
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5.4.2. Alternative Construction of Comprehensive Reputation Variables
In the foregoing section, the comprehensive reputation variables combine1 and 
combine2 are constructed via multiplication. I also constructed them via addition. More 
speciﬁcally, I created two dummies, hcr and hmv, based on the median of cr and mvalue: 
hcr is set to 1 if cr is greater than its median and to 0 otherwise, and hmv is set to 1 if 
mvalue is greater than its median and to 0 otherwise. combine3 is deﬁned as the sum of 
founder, inboard, and hcr and combine4 as the sum of founder, inboard, and hmv. Adding 
combine3 and combine4 to model (1) does not alter the results reported in Table 7. 
Table 12. Dealing with Serial Correlation
newloan_1 2004 2005 2006 2007 Newey-West
combine1*factor1 0.0005* 0.0006 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003*
combine1*factor2 0.0004* 0.0009* 0.0002 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0005***
combine2*factor1 0.0018** 0.0025 0.0008 0.0031** 0.0020* 0.0019***
combine2*factor2 0.0014** 0.0024 0.0005 0.0010 0.0022* 0.0017***
Note:  Coeﬃcients are the estimation results of model (1). ***, ** and * denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively.
















Control Variable Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Adj. R-square 0.144 0.148
F-stat 7.66 7.67
Obs 1,058 1,058
Note:  Control variables include lnsize, grow, cﬁo and oﬀer. White-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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5.4.3. Additional Variables to Control for Differences in Demand for Bank Loans
As previously noted, the variable newloan in this study is used to measure the amount 
that banks are willing to lend to it, but it may also reﬂect the diﬀerence between ﬁrms 
in their demand for bank loans as well. To further control for between-ﬁrm diﬀerences 
in demand for bank loans, I added two additional variables to proxy for diversiﬁcation 
and for whether more than one listed company was controlled by the same ultimate 
controlling owner. Industries were split in the same way as they were for model (1), after 
which the natural logarithm of the number of industries in which a company operates 
was computed based on its sales distribution among industry segments according to its 
annual report. These additional control variables do not alter the conclusions in Table 7 
(not reported).
5.4.4. Differences in Operational Risk
A company’s operational risk aﬀects its ability to borrow. Although a company’s size 
(lnsize) reﬂects such risk to a certain extent, I also measured it using the variable risk. 
The results of descriptive analysis, shown in Ta ble 14, suggest that there are signiﬁcant 
diﬀerences in risk between companies with a good and poor reputation when combine2 
is employed as the reputation variable. Adding risk to model (1), however, does not alter 
the conclusions in Table 7 (not reported).
Table 14. Reputation and Operational Risk
Volatility of stock returns
Mean Median 
Full sample 0.116 0.107
combine1 less than its median 0.119 0.108
combine1 greater than its median 0.113 0.106
DIFF 0.004 0.002
Mann-Whitney z-stat/Chi-square 1.054 0.690
combine2 less than its median 0.120 0.111
combine2 combine1 greater than its median 0.111 0.103
DIFF 0.009 0.007
Mann-Whitney z-stat/Chi-square 2.655*** 4.769**
Note:  The diﬀerence in means and medians is determined via the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The statistics for the mean test 
are Whitney z-stats, whereas those for the median are Chi-square. ***, ** and * denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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6. Conclusion
This study has investigated the relationship between accounting and reputation, 
an informal institution, in debt contracts in a setting characterized by an imperfect 
institutional environment. Creditors enjoy a poor level of protection in China, which 
does little to restrict borrowers’ ex post opportunistic behavior. Although the governance 
role of accounting information can restrict opportunistic behavior, it usually fails in the 
presence of severe such behavior because the governance role of accounting information 
is based on the assumption of an explicit contract. Severe opportunistic behavior also 
impairs the information role of accounting information. Although reputation can 
substitute for the governance role of such information, it provides banks with little 
information by which to evaluate a ﬁrm’s repayment ability. Although reputation may 
restrict opportunistic behavior, banks still require further accounting information to 
evaluate ﬁrms’ repayment ability, thereby restoring the information role of accounting 
information. There is thus both a substitutional and complementary relationship 
between reputation and accounting information. The empirical results of this study, 
which was based on a sample of family ﬁrms listed in China’s Chinese A-share stock 
market from 2004 to 2007, show that in China, where formal institutions are weak, the 
complementary relationship between reputation and accounting information is more 
pronounced than is the substitutional relationship. Thus, the aggregate eﬀect is that a 
strong reputation improves the usefulness of accounting information in debt contracts. 
Additional tests show that (1) analysts’ private information weakens the complementary 
relationship between reputation and accounting information and that (2) banks 
require a lower degree of conditional conservatism from ﬁrms with a better reputation, 
which suggests that reputation can substitute for the governance role of accounting 
information. Moreover, there is weak evidence to suggest that the eﬀect of reputation is 
diminished as the legal environment improves.
In contrast to the prior literature, which focuses on the relationship between 
accounting information and formal institutions, this study has investigated the 
relationship between such information and reputation, an informal institution, within 
the transaction cost economics framework, and has documented both a substitutional 
and complementary relationship between them. The study also offers a preliminary 
attempt at measuring the reputation of family ﬁrms and provides direct evidence of the 
way in which reputation has an eﬀect. In China, which is characterized by weak formal 
institutions, large numbers of transactions rely on informal institutions. Such a unique 
setting provides numerous opportunities for research whose results will have important 
implications for the economic activities of other transition economies. It is suggested 
that future research employ larger samples, compare family ﬁrms and non-family ﬁrms 
directly, and use panel data to avoid such econometrics problems as serial correlation, 
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